QUESTION 1: Does it violate the Federal Arbitration Act or otherwise undermine "equal footing" and
contract immunities when State Courts construe
the
Congressional policy
incorporate
or
accommodate inherent inequality to parties by
allowing for the dispensing with arbitrability and
contract construction- so that it further allows for
arbitrary state created discretionary rules that
affords the 'bundling' of each and every claim and
counterclaim that arises out of court process itselfto also be part and parcel of the -"all" the claimspresumably fit for the arbitrational forum?

QUESTION 2:
The litigation challenges jurisdiction by conditions precedent and Supreme Court
precedents of Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137
(1803) to Steel City Steel Co. v.-Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); and on to invoking
anomaly of Article III jurisdiction, as
a similar
alerted in Osborn v. Haley. 549 U.S. 225 (2007). In
light of this Court's holding in Elliot v. Piersol. 26
U.S. 328, 340 (1828) and other Supreme Court.
jurisdictional precedents: Does the fact that the
record plausibly holds that there is unproven
grounds of all
elements of the arbitrator's
jurisdiction; and the court ordering arbitration
nevertheless- thereby sets the arbitrator up for civil
charges in a separate cause of action for imposition
"trespasser"- if his
and plausibly being
a
jurisdiction is not proved upon the record with
sufficiency to standards and due process?

QUESTION 3: The litigation charges the Alabama
State Courts to be making per se rules of convention- that clash with Supreme Court precedents and
also federal and state court precedents. Mandamus
was petitioned, seeing that such process appeared
to be void on its face and would deny an appeal.
Assuming the aforesaid is plausible-the question is:
Would the State actually further the alleged errorunto violating the 14th Amendment and the Civil
Rights Statutes if the Courts construe the FAA to
afford discretion to deny inalienable liberties of
equal benefit of arbitration agreements and inherent immunities of freedom from
oppressive
forces of such contract and court adjudications,
when fraud is alleged to induce the arbitration and
fraud is further alleged to maintain the status quo
of parties before the Courts after rulings are made?

QUESTION 4: The litigation invokes the due
process requirement of having a fair Judge under
the Constitutional scrutiny of Tumey v. Ohio. 273
U.S. 510 (1927). The litigation also shows the
Courts to perceive a view that the FAA inherently
preempts any substantial due process inquiry and
that the Federal law demands arbitration on any
and all issues that may arise in whatever form or
fashion. Underscoring Tumey's common law right
to a fair Judge- the question is: Does the FAA
allows or otherwise requires the abridgement
and/or a specialized reformulation of the Alabama
or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by a State or
Federal Court, so that the Court may vary the due
process, the procedural standards and further
discount having the appearance of bias; thereby
promoting a clash with or showing inherent
conflict with 28 U.S.C. §

Does the Federal Arbitration Act allow state courts to construe the Congressional policy to incorporate or accommodate inherent inequality to parties by allowing for the dispensing with arbitrability and contract construction?