The Court's "collateral order" doctrine permits
interlocutory appeal with a two- pronged test for a
government official's claim to qualified immunity:
(i) whether the official violated a constitutional right,
and (ii) whether the right was clearly established in the
context involved.
When determining jurisdiction to review, some
Circuits require the appellant to 1) stipulate to the
Plaintiff's version of the facts; 2) accept the trial courts'
recitation of the facts; 3) or review the trial courts'
identification of material disputes of fact for legal
sufficiency only and 4) when there are no specific
findings by the trial court, remand for the findings or
"scour the record" for the disputed issues of material
fact that might suggest a Constitutional violation.
Also, some lower courts, including the Fifth Circuit,
also bifurcate the second prong and separately ask
whether the defendant's conduct was objectively
unreasonable. This can result in factual reasonableness
being considered in the second prong.
Accordingly, the question presented is: When
courts are deciding qualified immunity in Fourth
Amendment cases, shouldn't they recite the trial
court's identification of the disputed issues of material
fact regarding the seizure and excessive force when
exercising "collateral order" jurisdiction and before
applying the second, "clearly established" prong of the
test?

When courts are deciding qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment cases, shouldn't they recite the trial court's identification of the disputed issues of material fact regarding the seizure and excessive force when exercising 'collateral order' jurisdiction and before applying the second, 'clearly established' prong of the test?