Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that,
to prevent circumvention of habeas corpus's statutory
exhaustion of state remedies requirement, a prisonercannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 thatnecessarily implicates his criminal conviction, unlessand until that conviction is "favorably terminated." Since Heck , the circuits have hopelessly split, and this
Court has been internally divided, on whether thisfavorable termination rule continues to bar accrual of
§1983 claims after a prisoner has been released from
custody and habeas is no longer available. See
Muhammad v. Close , 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004)
(acknowledging it is unsettled whether release fromcustody "dispense[s] with the Heck requirement") .

The questions presented are:

1. Does the limitations period for a §1983 claim
that necessarily implicates a criminal conviction
accrue when a prisoner is released from custody,as four circuits hold, or when the ex-prisonerpersuades either a governor to pardon him or astate court to overturn his conviction, as sevencircuits, including the lower court, hold?

2. Does extending Heck 's favorable termination
rule to ex-prisoners who lack access to a federalremedy violate the rule of Patsy v. Board ofRegents of State of Fla. , 457 U.S. 496 (1982),
which prohibits a judicially imposed exhaustionof state remedies requirement for §1983 claims?

3. When extended to ex-prisoners, does Heck 's
favorable termination rule, which is satisfied by
a gubernatorial pardon that can be perpetually
pursued, imprudently eliminate the finalityotherwise afforded §1983 defendants by statutesof limitations and preclusion doctrines?

Does the limitations period for a §1983 claim that necessarily implicates a criminal conviction accrue when a prisoner is released from custody, as four circuits hold, or when the ex-prisoner persuades either a governor to pardon him or a state court to overturn his conviction, as seven circuits, including the lower court, hold?