The following un-disputed facts in this case pre
sents the grounds on which the petitioner frames his
question to the court.
On 7/8/16 & 7/11/16 the petitioner met with re
spondent 's attorney JOHN HERRING and he stated
to petitioner that this case will not end on the merits
and that the respondent will only pay cost and nothing
else. In mediation on 8/2/16, the respondent and their
attorney JOHN HERRING made the following unlaw
ful threats, thru a mediator, coercing the petitioner
into signing a mediation agreement for cost only;(l)
that petitioner had taken proprietary information
from the respondent without consent and that they
can sue petitioner 's employer Bartos Industries; (2)
that the petitioner had also used proprietary infor
mation from his employer Bartos Industries in his mo
tion for summary judgment; (3) that petitioner can be
black listed in the industry.

(1) Did the United States court of appeals affirm a
decision that exceeds their authority and lacks
subject matter jurisdiction by suspending sec
tion 31.03 of the Texas penal code, the Hobbs
Act, the FLSA and grants the respondent and
their attorneys immunity against prosecution
by holding that un-lawful threats of retaliation,
an in terrorem tactic as stated in Jacques v. Di-
Marzio, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2nd at (144), are pro
tected by mediation confidentiality and attorney client privilege which infringes on pe
titioner 's constitutional right to access to the
courts, due process and the equal protection
clause?

(2) Did the United States court of appeals affirm a
decision that infringed on petitioner 's constitu
tional rights to due process and equal treat
ment of the law, by refusing to render a decision
in a non-final order denying plaintiffs motion
for reconsideration to strike respondent 's an
swer pleading where the lower court deviated
from the established principles of law by: (1) not
following the doctrine of stare decisis and by in
correctly applying the tolling provisions of Rule
12(a)(4)(A) to rule 81; (2) by acting in excess of
its jurisdiction by allowing respondent 's affirm
ative defense claim of be a "non-traditional en
gineering firm, " which is strictly prohibited by
the Texas Engineering Practice Act; (3) and by
applying the "plausibility standard " pursuant
to Bell Altlantic Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) and clarified in Ascroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937 (2009), to petitioner 's complaint and
amended complaint and failing to apply the
same standard to respondent 's answer plead
ings? (Please note that the review of this ques
tion is based on this court 's finding upon review
of the merits that the mediation agreement and
final judgment was obtained by fraud, see pre
vious question) .

Did the United States court of appeals affirm a decision that exceeds their authority and lacks subject matter jurisdiction