1. Is it an unreasonable application of federal law to
hold, for Strickland purposes, that there was no
reasonable probability that the state's appellate
court would have granted sentencing relief if asked,when the same appellate court, as a historical fact,actually granted sentencing relief without
being
asked?

2. In reversing the district court's grant of habeas
relief, did the Seventh Circuit misidentify the stateappellate court's decision as one "not based onfederal law," although that state decisionexplicitly—though by concluding that there was no
reasonable probability that the state's appellatecourt would have granted sentencing relief if asked,when that same appellate court actually granted
sentencing relief without even being asked?

Is it an unreasonable application of federal law to hold, for Strickland purposes, that there was no reasonable probability that the state's appellate court would have granted sentencing relief if asked, when the same appellate court, as a historical fact, actually granted sentencing relief without being asked?