1. Was Petitioner denied due process by the state court's refusal to provide a hearing that was mandated by Georgia's DNA statute, particularly given Petitioner's overriding interest in avoiding being executed on the basis of false evidence, the increased likelihood of an erroneous ruling in the absence of such a hearing, and the State's minimal interest in expediency —an interest that should give way to the far greater societal interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice?

2. In considering the potential impact of favorable DNA results, did the Georgia court violate Petitioner's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by limiting its consideration of the evidence to the trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, instead of considering all the evidence developed in the case that bears on Petitioner's culpability?

3. In a capital case, does a state violate the Eighth Amendment by limiting DNA testing to cases in which the evidence would potentially acquit the defendant, even where it is reasonably probable that favorable DNA results would have resulted in a sentence less than death?

4. Does Georgia's DNA statute violate Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Eighth Amendment by targeting death-sentenced inmates and limiting their access to DNA on the basis of when the extraordinary motion for new trial was filed?

Whether the state court's refusal to provide a hearing mandated by Georgia's DNA statute denied due process