Congress enacted the Release of lien or discharge of property Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6325 (f) (2); Public Law 115-281, approved 12/1/18, to inform both the IRS and the People what was and was not allowed when the IRS issued a lien upon a person's property relating to a tax debt claim. IRS liens are allowed to be imposed, once an assessment is done, but when a lien is erroneously released after the assessment, it can be reinstated only if the statute of limitations has not elapsed. The statute clearly states "a certificate of release or nonattachment of a lien imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] was issued erroneously or improvidently, assessment has not expired, the Secretary may revoke such certificate and reinstate the lien, however, if after a lien is released erroneously and the period of limitation has expired, the liens are not allowed to be reinstated, even by the Secretary. This Act imposes an obligation upon the IRS to act within set boundaries and a fiduciary duty to the people to follow those boundaries and a court interpreting the statute must comply with that statutory plain language as set under the Chevron test pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The question presented is: Whether the courts' below, in conflict with this Court's ruling in Chevron, erroneously held the lien valid even though when it was erroneously released, and took a year to reinstate, the period of limitation after assessment had already elapsed making the liens' reinstatement invalid and contrary to the plain language under Section 6325 (f) (2)?

Absent contrary congressional intent, where the Advisory Committee Notes regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101 explains clearing this Supreme Court had determined a distinct difference between the phraseology of the various federal courts, claiming that a "district court of the United States" and a "United States District Court" as set by this Court, hold different meanings as set by the Advisory Committee where this Supreme Court's power to make rules of practice and procedure extends. The act concerning civil actions, as amended in 1966, which refers to 'the district courts of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases. * * *" 28 U.S.C. §2072, Pub. L. 89-773, §1, 80 Stat. 1323, contrary to the bankruptcy authorization for rules of practice and procedure "under the Bankruptcy Act." 28 U.S.C. §2075, Pub. L. 88-623, §1, 78 Stat. 1001. The Bankruptcy Act in turn created bankruptcy courts called "the United States district courts and the district courts of the Territories and possessions to which this title is or may hereafter be applicable." 11 U.S.C. §§1(10), 11(a), which provision applied also to criminal rules up to and including verdicts applies to "criminal cases and proceedings to punish for criminal contempt of court in the United States district courts, * * *, and in proceedings before United States magistrates." 18 U.S.C. § 3771. As set by congressional usage the phrase "district courts of the United States," without further qualification, traditionally included the district courts established by Congress in the states under Article III of the Constitution, which are "constitutional" courts, and has not included the territorial courts created under Article IV, Section

Whether the courts' below, in conflict with this Court's ruling in Chevron, erroneously held the lien valid even though when it was erroneously released, and took a year to reinstate, the period of limitation after assessment had already elapsed making the liens' reinstatement invalid and contrary to the plain language under Section 6325 (f) (2)?