Did Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) create a brightline rule that anytime a jury returns a sentencing verdict at the original trial it becomes a different sentencer situation and the presumption of judicial vindictiveness established by North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) is inapplicable upon retrial; so that, the trial court is not prevented from assessing a harsher sentenecing? Or, irrespective of the jury's involvement, because upon retrial, after a successful appeal, Judge Strother would have a motivation to engage in self-vindication and Judge Strother took part in assessing the total sentencing package by personally ordering consecutive sentencing, would a harsher sentencing package assessed upon retrial by Judge Strother be a true sentence increase; so that, the Pearce presumption would be applicable to prevent the assessment of a harsher sentence (without sufficient justification)?

Was Petitioner's trial counsel ineffective when he failed to advise Petitioner that upon retrial, after a successful appeal, Judge Strother could not have assessed a harsher sentencing package without sufficient justification and that upon retrial, without any election, Judge Strother would have had the responsibilty to assess punishment? Especially when the failure to provide that advice (and instead advising of a claimed 'legitimate concern [of] a higher sentence" upon retrial) resulted in Petitioner waiving his right to appeal, rather than appealing like Petitioner wanted to appeal?

Whether Texas v. McCullough created a bright-line rule that the presumption of judicial vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce is inapplicable when a jury returns a sentencing verdict at the original trial, or whether the Pearce presumption still applies when the judge participated in assessing the total sentencing package