Clifton D. Harvin v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
When a Petitioner relies upon the McQuiggin V Perkins 133 S.Ct. 1924 miscarriage of justice actual innoccence exception to overcome the AEDPA one year statute of limitations, and the District Court conducts only a statuatory and equitable tolling analysis where actual innocence was precluded in that analysis, in direct opposition to McQuiggin supra without consideration of McQuiggin supra in any way, did the Fifth Circuit err by finding that the actual innocence claim to overcome the time bar doesn't deserve encouragement to -proceed further, and then rely solely on that to preclude even the overview of thec1aims for valdity, without conducting a correctness of the District Court's procedural ruling analysis, conflicting with McQuiggin supra and Slack V McDaniel 120 S.Ct. 1595 in the time bar context?
In the actual innocence context, there exists a split between United States Court of Appeals. The split concerns the terms "newly presented" and "newly available." Which should control in the actual innocence miscarriage of justice exception?
Should this Court finally answer whether a Petitioner may beentitled to federal habeas corpus relief .on a freestanding claim of actual innocence where a State, in this case, Texas, allows a freestanding actual innocence claim as a federal due process violation question with no federal oversight, if a Petitioner can present a truly persuasvie innocence claim?
Did the Fifth Circuit err by finding that reason-able jurists--could --not debate the denial onthe_merit the claims related to the revocation and punishment when reasonable jurists have disagreed on the resolution of these issues already?
When a Petitioner relies upon the McQuiggin V Perkins 133 S.Ct. 1924 miscarriage of justice actual innoccence exception to overcome the AEDPA one year statute of limitations, and the District Court conducts only a statuatory and equitable tolling analysis where actual innocence was precluded in that analysis, in direct opposition to McQuiggin supra without consideration of McQuiggin supra in any way, did the Fifth Circuit err by finding that the actual innocence claim to overcome the time bar doesn't deserve encouragement to proceed further, and then rely solely on that to preclude even the overview of thezclaims for valdity, without conducting a correctness of the District Court's procedural ruling analysis, conflicting with McQuiggin supra and Slack V McDaniel 120 S.Ct. 1595 in the time bar context?