Marc Anthony Lowell Endsley, aka Marc Endsley v. Edmund G. Brown, et al.
Do civilly detained persons retain their fundamental rights to engage in voluntary sexual relations -- i.e., privacy, freedom of association, reproductive choice, and informed consent to medical treatment; and
can the "exercise of professional judgment" contemplated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) be used to deny such fundamental rights where there is no danger of violence;
are said detainees entitled to a hearing to determine if professional judgment was in fact exercised;
can said detainees refuse such professional judgment as part of their right to informed consent to medical treatment; and
can said detainees be subjected to punishment or "deterrence" for engaging in voluntary sexual relations?
Are civilly detained insanity acquittees similarly situated to those civilly detained as incompetent and/or gravely disabled for purposes of their fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of association, reproductive choice, and informed consent to medical treatment, and does the State need to show a legitimate and neutral, compelling governmental interest where disparity in such fundamental rights exist?
Are civilly detained persons entitled to proper Due Process procedures and predeprivation Due Process procedures prior to denial of their rights or privileges?
Can civilly detained persons be denied treatment for engaging is voluntary sexual relations?
Are civilly detained persons entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint prior to a ruling on a motion to dismiss?
Do civilly detained persons retain their fundamental rights to engage in voluntary sexual relations