In light of United States v Peter, 310 F.3d 709 (11th C ir 2002), does the ambiguousness of the nature of the term "material" within Title 18 USC 2252A(a)(2)(B), give the unintended breadth by: (A) authorizing District Courts to accept pleas of guilt without subject-matter jurisdiction, wherefore caprical use of elastic language is construed as a computer file, rather than disk, so long as the file "contains" an unlawful depiction; thereby, (B) substituting factual conduct in violation of United States v Edmond, 780 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir 2015); by modifying statutory elements in order to convict innocent persons of a crime for which they are not indicted?

When a prisoner alleges thorny constitutional issues, states facts and cites the law, in relation to and in support of such claims: (A) does a district court's catch-all denial, or failure to adjudicate all claims alleged, violate habeas procedure, when its decision runs contrary to the procedural rule established under Clisby v Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (4th Cir 1992), thereby, serving to render habeas review futile, as applied to that case; Likewise, (B) does a Court of Appeal's failure to clarify its blanket denial, of meritorious issues, violate a claimant's due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present such claims on habeas review, and/or place too significant of a burden at this mere propositional stage, during a aDA's threshold inquiry, as re-established in Buck v Davis, 132 S.Ct. 759 (2017)?

Whether the ambiguousness of the term 'material' within Title 18 USC 2252A(a)(2)(B) gives unintended breadth to District Courts to accept pleas of guilt without subject-matter jurisdiction