Given the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint case no. 17-3299, was it constitutional for officials of the Illinois Department of Correction to leave the parole warrant which had been voided, served in error on Aug. 24, 2009 in the computer as if it was an active warrant until Jan. 26, 2010?

Why was it unconstitutional for the Illinois Prisoner Review Board to fail to give Plaintiff a preliminary parole hearing to determine probable cause after the issuance of a parole warrant under State and Federal law?

The warrant which is issued pursuant to the United States Parole Commission under 18 USC 3401(b), how is it different from the parole warrant issued pursuant to the Unified States Parole Commission?

The Final Order Announced by the Circuit Court of Appeals in case no. 17-3299 in 903 F.3d conflicts with its own rulings made in Tolan V. Cotton, 572 U.S. 115 (2014) and Luther V. Molina, Loan F.2d 1350?

Could the constitutional violations which resulted from the warrant mentioned in question (a) be considered as grounds for relief?

Could it be unconstitutional for Plaintiff-Appellant to be compelled to defend the adequacy of a parole warrant which was voided?

The Court of Appeals order made Dec. 20, 2018 stated at page 1 that "Thus, the dismissal of this state law claim should have been without prejudice and we modify the judgment on this claim accordingly." Should Plaintiff have been given leave to amend count(s) of his Third Amended Complaint?

If the Circuit Court of Appeals in case no. 17-3299 does it conflict with their own ruling made in McDonald V. Adamson, 201 Ill.App.3d 1072, 234 F.3d 67 (7th Cir. 2016)?

The circumstances giving rise to counts (1-3) of case no. 17-3299 stemmed from the invalid warrant left in the computer by IDOC as if it was an active warrant, would those counts share a common nucleus of operative facts, such that they would all be tried in one judicial proceeding?

Was it unconstitutional for Michelle Littlejohn to sentence Appellant to fifteen (15) more months in prison after he had already served the entire sentence set by the court in case no. 17-3299?

Was it unconstitutional for the district court to disregard Plaintiff's request made under Northern District of Illinois Local Rule?

At what point after the parole warrant has been issued and there is a criminal charge pending wherein the parolee is being held on both, when is the parole warrant considered expired?

Whether the district court erred in denying petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of a state law that allegedly violates the First Amendment's free speech protections