I. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded that Gerald Long's Fourth Amendment right proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated because officers had probable cause for the search warrant; when proper standard under Supreme Court precedent is whether the search warrant was rendered stale due to the "remoteness of time between the observance of the alleged crime and the filing of a complaint seeking a search warrant?

2. Did both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals err when they concluded that the State had proven inevitable discovery for a cell phone seized in violation of Gerald Long's Fourth Amendment right proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures because officers "could and would have obtained a search warrant when proper standard under Supreme Court precedent is whether officers "obtained" a search warrant, and whether the evidence would have been inevitably "discovered by lawful means and without reference to any police error or misconduct?"

3. Did the Trial Court err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by not noticing or using the six factor test established for determining whether or not material is "lewd" in denying the Motion for a Finding of Directed Verdict; when proper standard under Supreme Court precedent require that the six factor test be used?

4. Did the Court of Appeals err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process in its assessment of the photographs using the six factor test by determining that the photos were lewd; when proper standard and review under Supreme Court precedent following the rules and guidelines set forth by the Court shows that the photographs are not "lewd" and therefore do not constitute child pornography?

5. Did the Trial Court err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process in denying the Motion for a Finding of Directed Verdict; when proper standard under Supreme Court precedent is whether Gerald Long was proven guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" on "every element of the crime?"

6. Did the Court of Appeals err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by ruling that there was no plain error in failing to instruct the jury as to "lewd" because trial counsel failed to tender an alternative instruction and therefore the issue was waived; when proper evidence under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(a) provides that "substantial defects" in criminal jury instructions "are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interest of justice require?" Did the failure of the Trial Court to properly instruct the jury result in a violation of Gerald Long's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury?

Additional Questions Presented, But Not Argued At This Time

7. Did the Trial Court err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury when it allowed, over objections, admission of other evidence of tried; when proper standards under Supreme Court precedent is whether the person was convicted solely on the evidence of the charges he was on trial for, and whether the evidence was reliable and relevant?

8. Did the Trial Court err and violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process and Eighth Amendment right proscribing Cruel and Unusual Punishment when it sentenced Gerald Long, and when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence; when proper sentencing under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois is to be based on "the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship?"

Did the Trial Court violate Gerald Long's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury