In a prosecution of a child pornography case under Title 18 U.S.C., Chapter 110, the government may seek to admit evidence of prior similar acts under Evid. R. 414 only after a hearing as required by Evid. R. 104. In turn, R. 104 conditions such admission only upon the "condition of fact" that the defendant is accused of any conduct proscribed by Chapter 110 of Title 18 U.S.C..

If a defendant subsequently pleads guilty, Crim. R. 11(d) provides that the defendant has a right to freely withdraw that guilty plea if the district court has not accepted the plea.

In an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of prior similar acts (propensity) evidence under Evid.R. 414, does Evid.R. 104 require a trial court to initially determine, by a preponderance of evidence, a condition of fact that the defendant actually engaged in child molestation conduct as charged, or may that court rely solely on the fact that a grand jury has found probable cause that such conduct occurred?

Does a prosecutor abuse his/her discretion by spuriously charging a defendant with a child molestation offense for the sole purpose of admitting prejudicial 414 propensity evidence for use as evidence in chief when the prosecutor knows there is no factual basis that such conduct occurred?

Does this Court endorse the Sixth Circuit's precedent-setting ruling that the approval of a plea agreement now suffices as an acceptance of a guilty plea under Crim. R. 11(d)(1)?

Whether the trial court must determine by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant engaged in child molestation conduct