WHETHER THE BENNETT AND PURSUANT TO GEORGIA LAW/ STATUTE O.C.G.A.817-9-4 50 SEe RI/EY V.GARRETT, 219 GA.345,133 S.E.2d 367 (1463 AND GUTIERMEZ V.STATE 29O GA.6OY3 2O1D AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER DISMISSES SAID MOTION TO VACATE INDICTMETNT ON THE PRETHISE THAT PETITIONER USED AN IMPROPER VEHICLE, CITING STATE V. CORITEN, 2OL @A.AP. 495 4A6-97 (2O10) AND LOWE V.STATE, 27 GA. 538, 539 GO03), - CAN THE COURTS BELOW CHANGE? THE NAUE OF PETITIONERS 'MOTION TO VACATE INDICTMENT'TO A CMOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGERIENT'CITINE IARPER V. STATE, 68 S.EAD 786, 787 G0OQ AND DISMISS PETITOWERES S 225Y HABEAS CORPUS PETITION S UNTIMELY ON THE PREMISE THAT SAID FICTICIOUS MOTION JO VACATE VOID JUDGEUENT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A STATUTRY APPLI CATION UNDER 2 N 8 OR MODIFY AJUDEEMONT OF CONVICTION IS NOT AN APROPRIATE REMEDY IN A CRIMINAI CASE AND THERETRE DIDNOT TOL THE TIME REQUIRED VACATE INDICTMENT INTO MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGEMENT IS IN CONFLICT WNH THE DECIS IN OTHER COURTS).

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner's motion to vacate the indictment on the premise that the motion did not qualify as a statutory application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because Georgia law provides that a motion to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case and therefore did not toll the time required under § 2244(b)