1. Is the definition of "crime of violence" in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstit utionally vague, given the Court's holding in Sessions v. Dimaya , 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) that the identical residual clause definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States , 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)?

2. If a completed offense is categorically a "crime of violence" within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause because it has the use or threat of " violent force" as an element, is the attempted commission of th at offense automatically and categorically a "cr ime of violence ," irrespective of whether the substantial step required for conviction is violent, and even if the attempt offense does not require specific intent?

3. Given Congress' express "Clarification of Section 924(c) of Title 18, United States Code" in Section 403 of the First Step Act , does that clarif ying amendment apply to a defendant convicted and sentenced to a consecutive 25 -year term on one of two § 924(c) counts in a first § 924(c) prosecution prior to the enactment of the Act, but who se sentence has not yet been finally imposed because his case remains on direct review?

Is the definition of 'crime of violence' in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague?