What constitutes sufficient evidence of knowledge to support two level enhancement for "knowingly engaging in distribution" of child pornography under USSG §2G2.2(b)(3)(F)? In the present case the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner "knowingly" distributed child pornography as required by the 2016 amendments to USSG §2G2.2(b)(3)(F). The government did not introduce any evidence showing Petitioner knew of the file sharing properties of the application and knowingly used the application to distribute child pornography.

Whether the prosecutor breached the terms of plea agreement. Although the prosecutor requested the court impose an 87-month sentence, as specified in the plea agreement, she breached the agreement because she failed to advocate for the bargained for sentence; repeatedly and exclusively argued that the crime was "heinous" and "exceedingly grave in nature"; analogized possession of child pornography to murder, rape and child molestation; and argued Petitioner deserved a severe punishment.

What constitutes sufficient evidence of knowledge to support two-level enhancement for 'knowingly engaging in distribution' of child-pornography under USSG-§2G2.2(b)(3)(F)?