Whether an individual with a disability (as that term is defined in 29. U.S.C. Section 705(20)) who has entered into an Individualized Plan for Employment (I.P.E.) agreement for driver training to improve his marketability in the job market and find employment as a light package delivery driver (remunerative. occupation) and actively participated in such training by a driving school through his State vocational rehabilitation program, had a "protected liberty or property interest" to such services (see, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sections 701, 722 1 and 723; South Carolina Code of Laws (Vocational Rehabilitation), Section 43-31-60?

After a qualified individual with a disability is already participating in his I.P.E. training, and prior to the completion of such training, is there a denial of substantive and procedural "due process'!, that. the designated State unit (Vocational Rehabilitation Department) usurped the procedural "mandatory language" of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 722(c)(7), by abruptly discontinuing the client's training before a decision by a mediator, hearing officer, or reviewing officer?

Where, prior to discontinuing a client's vocational rehabilitation training, the designated State unit ignored its duty under 29 U.S.C. Section 722 to provide the client with timely "Notification" of any of his entitled "Rights and Assistance", should they (the dSu) prevail on an "equitable tolling" issue?

Did the designated State unit violate the visually impaired petitiOner's substantive and procedural due process rights by citing his lane driving errors, after failing to ever provide the, additional services (clip-on rearview mirror) suggested for the petitioner by the state department of motor vehicles (see the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 723(a)(6)(D); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12103))?

Did "collateral estoppel and res judicata" barred the Respondents from re-litigating their claims to "permissible discretion" , et cetera, in defense of. their actions (in the RenewedMotion for Summary Judgment), after the District Court denied those claims in their original Motion for Summary Judgment and they failed to "appeal" that ruling?

Was the petitioner's lawsuit under 42. U.S.C. Section1983 against the Governor's Office Director of Administration and Executive Policy and Programs headed by Gary Anderson (Michelle Dhunjishah reviewed for Anderson) who was the "iial policymaking authority " and sanctioner of the policy actions applied by the designated State unit to stop the driver training, properly rou.ght against the State ov'ernment entities?

Should petitioner's lawsuitfor violation of his federal law (Itdivid.ualied Plan for Employment) rights., as a "contract dispute" -have ben properly subject to a "three year" filing statute of limitation

Whether an individual with a disability has a protected liberty or property interest in vocational rehabilitation services