Did the United States Sentencing Commission exceed their statutory authority under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, in Amendment 268, by replacing 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) definition for the term "crime of violence" with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)'s definition for the term "violent felony."

Does the Sentencing Reform Act's 28 U.S.C. 994(h) mandate of a sentence of imprisonment "at or near the maximum term "under the statute of conviction render the procedural guideline calculation used to arrive at that sentence a vehicle for increasing the minimum sentence that can be imposed under the statute of conviction.

Does Johnson, and Dimaya's invalidation of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)'s risk of force clause render every civil or criminal statute defined by U.S.C. § 16(b), such4 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) and § 924(c)(3)(b) unconstitutionally vague.

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing petitioner's claims for violation of their civil rights and due process rights under the 14th Amendment