The question presented by this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erroneously affirmed Mr. Patmon's sentence under USSG § 2K2.1 based on its determination that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) is a "crime of violence" under the enumerated offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit cited to its prior precedent in United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018), rejecting the argument that the Georgia statutory definition of "deadly weapon" could be overbroad based on the plain language of the statute and a proffered hypothetical instead of a specific state case.

Thus, this case presents the following broad question:

(1) Under Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 189 (2007), must a defendant always identify a state case to establish the least culpable conduct criminalized by a statute, or can the plain language of the statute itself establish the statute's breadth?

Whether the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erroneously affirmed Mr. Patmon's sentence under USSG § 2K2.1 based on its determination that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) is a 'crime of violence' under the enumerated offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines