I. Whether the U.S.A.'s failure to "respond" and the Magistrate Judge's failure to "deem admitted" in this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding " the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, '[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.' " Tolan v. Cotton, supra , 134 S.Ct. at 1863, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 255.

II. Whether the U.S.A.'s failure to "respond" and the Magistrate Judge's failure to "deem admitted" in this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding the "general rule that a 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.' Anderson , 477 U.S., at 249 …. Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' [FRCP] 56(a). … a court must view the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the opposing party.' Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 … (1970); see also Anderson, supra , at 255…. " Tolan v. Cotton, supra , 134 S.Ct. at 1866.

III. Whether the U.S.A.'s failure to "respond" and the Magistrate Judge's failure to "deem admitted" in this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding "the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Tolan v. Cotton, supra , 134 S.Ct. at 1868.

Whether the U.S.A.'s failure to 'respond' and the Magistrate Judge's failure to 'deem admitted' conflict with Supreme Court precedent