What is the proper application, if any, of the Contracts Clause to a plea agreement contract, and did Texas misapply the Federal Contracts Clause to Petitioner Warterfield's April 18, 1994 plea agreement contract?

Since there is currently a deepening split on the proper application of the Contracts Clause among the United States Courts of Appeals, and possibly between the States, should the Court address the split at this time and issue a uniform Contracts Clause standard applicable to contracts ranging from socio-economic to plea agreements, and from private to public? Likewise, should a separate Contracts Clause standard applicable solely to plea agreement contracts be now established by the Court?

Does the retroactive application to a plea agreement contract of legislation enacted subsequent to the time of contract violate the Federal Due Process Clause as interpreted by Supreme Court precedent such as INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and et cetera apply as well to State plea agreements, or else is a new precedent required whereby the States are clearly confined to the status of the law at contract formation in making performances else the Due Process Clause be thereby violated?

What is the proper application of the Contracts Clause to a plea agreement contract, and did Texas misapply the Federal Contracts Clause to Petitioner Warterfield's April 18, 1994 plea agreement contract?