1.Whether a defendant's personal knowledge of an
exculpatory or favorable fact relieves the State of its duty to
disclose evidence in its possession proving the existence of the
favorable fact and demonstrating the police have dishonestly
denied the existence of the exculpatory or favorable fact?

2.Whether a defendant's personal knowledge of
information showing his innocence relieves the State of its duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence proving or supporting the
defendant's innocence?

3.Whether the materiality prong of the Brady analysis
requires a reviewing court to consider how the undisclosed
information would have affected counsel's strategic choices and
what the jury would have been entitled to find if it had heard
the undisclosed information impeaching the credibility of the
police and the investigation the police had conducted?

4.When a police officer knowingly testifies falsely in a
deposition and thereby misleads defense counsel, does that
constitute a violation of due process under the Giglio line of
cases?

5.Whether under Glossip v. Gross , 576 U. S. _ (2015),
the consideration of the severity and duration of pain likely to
be produced under the existing lethal injection protocol and the
consideration of whether the availability of an alternative has
adequately been shown are to be evaluated holistically or are
they separate and distinct steps?

6.Whether the known probability that some, not all, of
those who are executed under a lethal injection protocol will
experience pain and the mental anguish the condemned will feel
in anticipating that he or she might be one of the unlucky ones
who will experience the pain must be considered in determining
whether use of such a protocol violates the Eighth Amendment?

7.Whether a condemned inmate must show that a readily
available alternative exists if he has established that the
existing method of execution creates a substantial risk of
severe pain?

8.Whether other states' use of a method of execution
satisfies a condemned inmate's burden to establish a readily
available alternative?

9.When a condemned inmate's screams as the first drug in
the three-drug protocol is administered and the manufacturer has
warned that its administration occasionally causes severe pain,
can an Eighth Amendment challenge that relies on the inmate's
screams as demonstrative of the infliction of pain be dismissed
on the grounds that the claim rests on speculation?

Whether a defendant's personal knowledge of an exculpatory or favorable fact relieves the State of its duty to disclose evidence