Steven Madina Esparza v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
HabeasCorpus
I. Under GONZALES V. THALER, 565 U.S.134(2012), does a Petitioner's conviction become 'Final" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (A), 30 days after the State's highest Court 'Dismisses" his Petition for Discretionary Review as untimely, or, in a subsequent order Refusing such review(App.H at 1-3; App.B; and App-D, Ex.A at 2-3)?
In determining when a Petitioner's conviction becomes 'Final' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), are Federal Judges authorized to employ the 'Look Through' presumption as announced in Ylst V. NUNNEMAKER, 501 U.S. 797(1991), which requires Federal Judges to determine whether or not the State Courts adDucated the merits under 28 U.S-C- §225(d)(1)(2)? Did the District Court Err in presuming that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequent order "Dismissed" Esparza's PDR(App.H at 1-3; App.B; App.D,Ex.A at 2-3)?
II.. How should the "Equitable Tolling" as announced under HOLLAND V. FLORIDA, 560 U.S. 631(2010), be applied to a Court-Appointed Appellate Counsel "Gross Negligence" during a critical point of a proceeding?
Did the Lower Court apply a "Rigid Standard" (App.B at 2, App.H at 5-9)?
Under GONZALES V. THALER, when does a petitioner's conviction become final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)