1. Does Pena-Rodriguez apply retroactively to cases on collateral review?

2. The Eleventh Circuit first denied a certificate of appealability ("COA") on the theory that no reasonable jurist could find that Petitioner was prejudiced by Gattie's presence on the jury. After this Court found to the contrary and ordered further consideration, the Eleventh Circuit then denied a COA because it concluded that, while Petitioner did not learn of Gattie's racist views prior to state habeas proceedings and thus could not have challenged his death sentence on that ground at trial or on direct appeal, Pena-Rodriguez had created a new claim that first had to be exhausted in state court. After Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the Pena-Rodriguez claim was not new and, in any event, had already been exhausted, the Eleventh Circuit then determined that a COA was unavailable both because Petitioner had failed to overcome the procedural default of the claim and because Pena-Rodriguez is not retroactive. Particularly given the Eleventh Circuit's constantly shifting rationale for denying a COA, did that court err in concluding that no reasonable jurist could debate whether Petitioner's colorable claim – that his death sentence is invalid because a juror voted to impose it based on Petitioner's race – together with this Court's intervening decision in Pena-Rodriguez, constitute extraordinary circumstances under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) that would warrant reopening Petitioner's federal habeas proceeding to address the merits of that claim?

Whether a juror's racial bias affected a death sentence