(1) Whether reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district
court's procedural ruling that Gulbrandson's second-in-time § 2254 petition was
second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), where its factual
predicate was a new merits judgment of death eligibility under A.R.S. § 13703(F)(6), in a successive post-conviction relief proceeding, and, therefore, the
claim, was unripe at the time he filed his the initial § 2254 petition; and

(2) Whether reasonable jurists would debate whether Gulbrandson pleaded a
substantial Eighth Amendment claim where the state court failed to apply a
narrowing construction to the "especially heinous or depraved" statutory
aggravating factor found to be facially vague in Walton, see A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6),
by failing to apply the crucial curative mental state element prescribed by Bocharsky
to prescribe when the infliction of injuries is "gratuitous," itself a narrowing
definition of (F)(6), which resulted in Gulbrandson's being found eligible for death
based solely on the finding of an un-narrowed statutory aggravator.

Whether reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court's procedural ruling that Gulbrandson's second-in-time § 2254 petition was second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)