Whether The Seventh Circuit Contravened The Holding Of Griffith By Concluding That Booker And Pepper Were NOT Retroactive To The Petitioner's Case Without Conducting Any Inquiry As To When And If The Petitioner's Conviction Became "Final" Following The Seventh Circuit's Vacatur On Count One And Its Issuance Of Its Mandate Returning Jurisdiction To The District Court?

Whether A Conviction Becomes Final For Griffith Purposes (a) After A Defendant Has Won A Direct Appeal And (b) A New Intervening Judgment Has Been Rendered Pursuant To An Appellate Court Mandate After The Conclusion Of The Related Direct Appeal And Certiorari That Led To The Vacatur, As Held By The Ninth Circuit, OR Whether The Conviction (c) Becomes Final Following The Conclusion Of The Direct Appeal And Certiorari (But Before The District Court Carries Out The Appellate Mandate By Issuing An Amended Judgment In Compliance With Its Mandate) As Held By The Second, Fourth And Seventh Circuits?

Whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(f)(1)'s And 3742(g)'s Mandatory Statutory "Resentencing" Requirements Suspend Finality For Griffith Purposes Where The Statutory Resentencing Provisions Means The Defendant's Sentence Remains Subject To Revision And, Therefore, NOT Final?

Whether A Mandate That Directs The Vacatur Of A Conviction And Sentence That "Unbundles" A Sentencing Package Suspends Finality For Griffith Purposes Where, Due To The Unbundling, A Discrete Portion Of A Vacated Sentencing Package May Be Reimposed As To The. Remaining Non-Vacated Counts Meaning That They Are Subject To Revision And, Therefore, NOT Final?

Whether The Petitioner Was Entitled To The Retroactive Benefit Of Booker And Pepper Where Those Decisions Were Issued By This Court Prior To His Direct Appeal Concluding With The Execution Of An Amended Judgment Issued By The District Court In Conformance With His Successful Direct Appeal?

Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in vacating the Petitioner's conviction and sentence pursuant to Count One of his Superseding Indictment