1. Whether Riley was denied his 6th and 4th Amendment Right to have his jury assisted via instructions on the application of legal principles to the evidence and law, that is - the legal assessment of the separateness of the two alleged events of the crime" whereby they could determine "the whole of the wrong of the crime" of which the State sought to convict/sentence(punish) Riley for; and if so then whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal affirming of the District Court's disposition of the Respondent's position was wrongly decided.

2. Whether the words "two-events", within the term "a legal assessment of the separateness of two events" define: "an occurrence or incident, or gathering or activity" hence "the lieu" and then in the absence of Riley's jury being able to consider such "[causation]" "was not his due process under the 5th and 14th Amendment Violated and if so then whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal affirming of the District Court's disposition of the Respondent's position wrongly decided.

3. Whether the word "intent" within the term "independent felonious intent" indicatively construe "mens rea of Riley", hence, "the mens rea's and; the word "purpose" within the term "independent felonious purpose" construe "the actus rea"; and, if so then was not Riley's 6th and 14th Amendment Right Violated where the State failed to prove-or-disprove these elements whereby Riley's jury via instructions could have properly determined his guilt or innocence and, if so then whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal affirming of the District Court's disposition of the Respondent's position wrongly decided.

4. Whether the term "legal assessment of the separateness of two events "EThat may be' conducted by the trial judge" construe permissiveness (discretion) which [is not] mandatory, thus implying that Riley's jury as well "may have" conducted by way of "consideration-weighing-and determining "the legal assessment of the separateness of the alleged two events "in order to help them reach a proper verdict of Riley's guilt or innocence in accordance to his 6th and 14th Amendment Rights; and if so whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal affirming of the District Court's disposition of the Respondent's position wrongly decided.

5. Whether the traditional burden which Our system of criminal justice deems essential in enforcement of procedure in the 6th and 14th Amendment such as in Riley's case, require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and thus, the jury to consider, "that which is-or- is not" where "That which is-or-is not" will ultimately seal the fate of Riley, rather it is that of his guilt or innocence; and, if so then whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal affirming of the District Court's disposition of the Respondent's position wrongly decided.

6. Whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge that the case of Space which it brought to the forefront in its Order was reversed and done so on a similar-issue likened to Riley's and should have these served as a supervening development lending reason to grant Riley's then appeal; and so, Whether the erroneously exemption of elements by Illinois such as in Riley's case violate due process and equal protection of the law and will sever an obligation to well and followed Supreme Court law, thereby alleviating the State burden to prove essential elements -and-the right of the accused to a jury determination thereof for future peoples criminally accused of crime, thus, shrinking-frit

Whether Ritey was denied his 6th Amendment right to have his jury assessed with instructions on the application of legal principles to the evidence and law that is the legal assessment of the separateness of the two alleged events of the crime