Does the Secretary of Labor have standing to sue for "losses" to the surplus of an ERISA defined benefit welfare plan - i.e., a theoretical injury to a legal abstraction -- under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) or (a)(5), without also showing concrete harm to the present property interests of participants or beneficiaries?

Whether the Third circuit correctly held—in conflict with this Court - that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and (a)(5) authorized the courts to ignore contractual language, supersede the interpretation by the person with settlor/sponsor/administrator and trustee powers, and refuse to recognize his right to amend welfare benefit plans and deprive the Secretary of standing?

Did the District Court's order to permanently bar Petitioner from providing services to any employee benefit plan exceed the limited "appropriate relief' permitted by 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2) and (5), especially when Congress only barred felons from positions in ERISA plans in 29 U.S.C. § 1, and the court otherwise granted a complete and adequate remedy at law?

Does the Secretary of Labor have standing to sue for 'losses' to the surplus of an ERISA defined benefit welfare plan without showing concrete harm to the present property interests of participants or beneficiaries?