Under Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000), may a federal habeas corpus petitioner invoke the rule of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) to show that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel provides "cause" for the procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel argument argued as "cause" for the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim? See also Edwards, 529 U.S. at 458 (Breyer, J., concurring)(outlining two-layer cause analysis applicable when a "cause" argument is itself defaulted)

May a federal habeas corpus petitioner use Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to overcome the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim by arguing that s/he has "cause" under Martinez for the default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel argument argued as "cause" for the default of that constitutional claim?

Is Edmund Zagorski entitled to relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) in this capital case, and/or did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying relief, especially where Mr. Zagorski has a meritorious claim for relief under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)? See Zagorski v. Mays, slip op. at 10-15 (Cole, C.J., dissenting)(concluding that Zagorski is entitled to relief from judgment); Compare Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)(lower courts abused discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief in capital case).

Whether a federal habeas corpus petitioner can invoke the rule of Martinez v. Ryan to show that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel provides 'cause' for the procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel argument argued as 'cause' for the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim