Were the Appellant's right to Due Process of Law violated and proceedings unfair considering that the Second Circuit granted both summary affirmance to Govenment and counsel's permission to withdraw, without formally addressing and revolving any of Appellant's issues outlined in Pro se Anders' Response and Petition for En Banc; emcompassing post Beckles uncertainty, the invalidation of U.S.C. 16(b) issues of which counsel never addressed in conflicting Anders Brief; relevant issues pertaining to Amend 709 (2007) and loyalty to Booker, and in particually, the Ex Post Facto concerns the District Court never resolved and was reserved for Appellate review?

Was counsel ineffective for not conducting research on relevant law based on actual innocence of the conviction used to trigger U.S.S.G. Section 4B1(a) and 4B1.2(a) sentencing enhancements. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) oppose to acquiescing to new arrest rule which counsel clearly understood that Appellant's sequence of arrest history would not meet the exception of the "New Rule" established inAniendment 709 (2007)?

Did Amendment 709 limit a District Court's authority over the advisory, guidelines in determining if prior convictions was either "single" or "separate" and if so, is the new policy promugated in Amendment 709 unloyal to Booker i.e., U.S.S.G. being "advisory only", but somehow U.S.S.G. sub section 1B1.1O(c) being [ex]empt from "advisory" if so what remedy is available 'for such malfeasance?

Could U.S.C. Section 16(b) be void for one purpose of application, but somehow valid to lend authority by reference to U.°S.S.G. 4B1 to designate Appellant a career offender for a "violent offense" that does not categorically involve "violent force" as established in 2010 Johnson, 599 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265 176 L.Ed?

5). Did the District Court err in not applying the rule of lenity in a case such as this one where the two drug, cases were factually related pursuant to U.S.S.G. §1B1'.3(a)(1)(b) and U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(1) but the unlawful conviction in question triggered IJ.S.S.G. 4B1(a)?

6'). Its counsel's Alan M. Nelson position in ANDERS BRIEF pg 27 that Appellant's sentence was, procedually reasonable and in accordance with the guideance set forth in Rat toball'i, so the question turns on, is Rattoballi even capable of remedying Appellant's Actual Innocence anomaly along with all the interelated issues at its core?

Were the Appellant's right to Due Process of Law violated