John Phillip Bender v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
Did the lower court clearly err abusing its discretion applying certificate of appealability ("COA") law outside Constitutional bounds, with no clear reason. for expedited pre-response sua sponte dismissal or why claims are meritless, by determining jurists of reason could not disagree with the resolution of constitutional claims presented, or jurists of reason could not conclude issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further?
Considering interplay between rules, statutes and precedents of this Court, did the lower court clearly err, applying incorrect standards, allowing AEDPA limitations to trump access to courts, habeas review and appeal, rather than addressing merits of prima facie compelling showing of innocence, either as a free-standing innocence claim or as a gateway to review of a first filing?
Should the Court consider, or remand for consideration, habeas claims: a. Can evidence be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led rational .jurytO find guilt beyond'.a reasonable doubts? b. Does prosecution, conviction, sentencing and imprisonment for debt violate substantial constitutional rights? c. Was petitioner denied reasonable notice of the nature and cause of the accusations sufficient to defend and for jeopardy to attach? d. Did jury charge errors so infect the entire trial that theresulting convictions violate due process? e. Were convictions obtained through knowing use of material false and misleading testimony by the prosecution?
Did the lower court clearly errabusing discretion, by applying 28 U.S.C. §2253 COA requirements to Rule 60(b) motions, limiting Rule 60 to federal, not state judgments, and without addressing merits of motions and without docketing denials as normal appeals?
Did the lower court clearly err abusing its discretion applying certificate of appealability (COA) law outside Constitutional bounds