Premise of the Question: A Federal Judge is a Board member and Board advisor of a major social organization. The defendant in a case being heard by the Federal Judge is a sponsor of and donor to the social organization. Further, the legal firm and one of its principals representing the defendant also sits on the Board with the Federal Judge. None of these relationships are disclosed to the plaintiff. Question: Does the above scenario represent a violation of Rule 455(a), an appearance of impropriety and/or conflict of interests? (See table of authorities No-2 & 3).

Does violation of Rule 455(a) call for retroactive recusal and vacating prior orders and Summary Judgments by the Judge of District Court? (See table of authorities No-2, 3 & 4).

Is vacating Summary Judgments of District Courts by default vacate or de-publish succeeding affirmations by Appellate Courts?

Does the doctrine of res judicata override multiple errors by CAFC in their prior affirmation of a District Court's flawed summary judgment as well as justify ignoring new evidence?

Can testimony under Rule 702 by a recognized expert engineer, a former employee of the defendant, who was not available during litigation, be construed as testimony by fact witness and accepted as new evidence and under Rules 60(b)(2)(6). See table of authority reference No-6.

Is bringing new evidence, "out of time" as claimed by District Judge based on newly discovered public disclosure of defendant (or defendant's subsidiary) that was archived by defendant, amount to failing in performing a "reasonable due diligence" by the plaintiff?

The premise of the question is: Although Appellate Court affirmed Summary Judgment of District Court, Appellate Court also removed a restriction (not harmless error) from Summary Judgment. The removal of the said restriction has changed the intellectual property rights of the plaintiff. Question: Does the removal of the "restriction" amount to substantive change under Rule 60(b)(1)(5)?

The premise of the question: Rule 60(c) stipulates tolling of time for new evidence as one year from "entry of final judgment", order or "legal proceeding". Question: Can tolling of time by legal proceeding prevail over tolling by "entry of final judgment"? And more so if substantive change was imposed during legal proceeding? (See table of authorities No-5).

Does the above scenario represent a violation of Rule 455(a), an appearance of impropriety and/or conflict of interests?