Arthur Lawton Clark v. Walter Berry, Warden, et al.
HabeasCorpus
Why do the fed.District Courts and the 11th Cir. Court of Appeals apparently agree that I have only stated that petitioner's indictment is simply "Flawed"?
By discounting the lack of elements in petitioners the 11th Cir. Courts have alse avoided petitioner's claim that his trial Counse/ was furnishing ineffective assistance when. after delivering a he urged petitioner to plead quilty. the District Attorney T. Vaughn. U.S. threat from Supreme Court cases, 11th State Supreme and Court cases all hold that ineffective assistance From. counsel causing defendant's conviction on a woid indictment constitute the "cause and prejudice" necessary to create an exception to a procedural bar. Why do the courts in the Uth Cir. discount petitioner's claim of an obuiously void indictment and inefective assistance of counsel, and grant a motion. to dismiss his habeas corpus, his trdal couuse when delivereda prosecutorged his quilty plea and als threat, since these consfitutional violations untimely"filing.
Did the District Court purposefolly avoid pefitioner's claim of ineffective assistance, when it granted the Attorney General's "Motion to Dismiss based on untimely by said attorney, by stating also in the same order, that petitioner's appellate afforney had repre -sented pefitioner with litigence"?
Why do the federal District courts in the 11th Cir. innocence" argument and requiring a finding of "new evidence, when the same cited case of (Murrayv, Carrier x provides for an exception to a procedural bar by alternate means?
Why does Federal habeas review by reading and the 11th cin Coorf af Appeals approval, confict with severad other U.s. Cir Court of Appeals cases holding that "in custody"canbe From a prisoner released on parole, one who is oufon bond, or even when one s in custody" from the "failure to apply
Whether petitioner's indictment and guilty plea were constitutionally deficient, and whether the lower courts erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and procedural default