Is Heflin, 358U.S. 415, 3 L. Ed. 2d. 407, 79 S. Ct. 451 (1959), still the controlling precedent? Herein, this court held that the text of 28 U.S.C. 2255 did not allow prisoners to utilize section 2255 to collaterally attack any portion of their "consecutive sentencing scheme," that the prisoner was not "currently under."

Is the writ of Coram Nobis, codified at 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), the All Writs Act, the proper avenue for federal inmates seeking to challenge a portion of a consecutive sentencing scheme, in which, the federal post-conviction remedy 28 U.S.C. 2255 is unavailable, inadequate, and ineffective to test the legalities of a defendants sentence or conviction due to custody concerns?

Does this court's decisions in Johnson, 135 U.S. 2551 (2015) and Dimaya, 584 U.S. _(2018), striking down similarly worded residual clauses of the Armed Career Criminal Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and the United States Code definition statute for Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. 16(b) for violating Fifth Amendment due process protections also void 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(b) residual clause?

Does petitioner's predicate crimes of armed bank robbery, under 18 U.S. 2113(a), (d), and simple carjacking, under 18 U.S.C. 2119(1) satisfy 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause, when both predicates can be committed "by intimidation?"

Whether the writ of coram nobis is the proper avenue for a federal inmate to challenge a portion of a consecutive sentencing scheme when the federal post-conviction remedy under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is unavailable, inadequate, and ineffective