Fletcher v. Honeywell International Inc. , 892 F.3d
217 (6th Cir. 2018) holds that a "CBA's general
durational clause applies to [retiree] healthcarebenefits unless it contains clear, affirmative languageindicating the contrary." Fletcher holds that courts
may not consider "extrinsic" trial evidence of theparties' intentions even though the CBA—read"naturally"—is "arguably" ambiguous, "implies"healthcare until the retiree's "death," and explicitlypromises to continue healthcare for the retiree'ssurvivors' "lifetime."

Fletcher 's reluctant concurring judge recognizes that
the Honeywell CBAs are "ambiguous" on "their face"
and require consideration of "extrinsic evidence" to"ascertain the intent of the parties"—but that SixthCircuit decisions "preclude" this.

Fletcher raises these questions warranting review
under S.Ct.Rules 10(a) and (c):

1. whether
Fletcher conflicts with CNH Industrial
v. Reese , 138 S.Ct. 761 (2018) and other Supreme Court
decisions holding that obligations outlasting CBAexpiration may be "implied" and with the SeventhCircuit holding that lifetime retiree healthcareobligations do not require "'magic words' or unequivocalcontract language";

2. whether
Fletcher applies an anti-vesting
presumption which conflicts with M&G Polymers USA,
LLC v. Tackett , 135 S.Ct. 926 (2015), which abrogated
all presumptions regarding collectively-bargainedretiree healthcare as violating "ordinary contractprinciples";

3. whether Fletcher ignores "federal common law"
patent and latent ambiguity principles, in conflict with
Third and Seventh Circuit fringe-benefit decisions;

4. whether Fletcher elevates judicial suppositions
over due process required by Rule 12(b)(6); and

5. whether Fletcher 's "new heightened standard"
again warrants "exercise of this Court's supervisorypower" where Sixth Circuit judges write that theCircuit's post- Tackett retiree healthcare decisions cause
"contradiction and confusion in an area of the law thatdemands consistency and clarity"; that despiteTackett 's direction that "the parties' intentions control,"
the Circuit has "installed duration clauses as the newabsolute determiner of intent, regardless of the actualintent of the parties"; and that the Circuit's"jurisprudential path" since Tackett "should sit
uneasily with all of us."

Whether collectively-bargained retiree healthcare benefits may be implied and do not require unequivocal contract language