The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") limits
restitution in enforcement actions to "losses
proximately caused" by a violation of the CEA and
CFTC regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 18a-1(d)(38)(A). This
Court's decision in Bank of America Corp. v. City of
Miami, Florida, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) holds
foreseeability is not enough to satisfy proximate
cause. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 3438-44 (2005) holds that proximate cause
requires a plaintiff to show loss causation, meaning
"not only that had he known the truth he would not
have acted [i.e., reliance, or transaction causation] but
also that he suffered actual economic loss." The
Eleventh Circuit below ruled, much as it did in Bank
of America, that foreseeability and reliance are all §
13a-1(d)(3)(A) requires to satisfy proximate cause and
specifically held loss causation is not required.

The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed a lifetime
industry ban against Petitioners. The injunctive relief
provisions of § 13a-1(a) authorize no such relief, and
the circuits are split on whether an injunction may be
a penalty. The questions presented are:

1. Whether foreseeability and reliance alone,
without any proof of loss causation, satisfy § 13a1(d)(8)(A)'s_ proximate cause requirement, in
contravention of City of Miami and Dura; and

2. Whether a lifetime industry ban is a penalty
and therefore beyond a district court's statutory and
equity power to issue without violating separation-ofpowers principles.

Whether foreseeability and reliance alone, without any proof of loss causation, satisfy § 13a-1(d)(8)(A)'s proximate cause requirement, in contravention of City of Miami and Dura