The Carmack Amendment ("Carmack") provides
the exclusive remedy for shippers to hold rail carriers
liable for damage to cargo. Under the federally required uniform bill of lading ("UBL"), a shipper must
file a written claim with the carrier within nine
months. If the carrier denies that claim, the shipper
then has two years and one day to file suit.

This Court long ago directed courts to apply this
requirement in a practical way, focusing on whether a
notice sufficiently apprises the carrier of the character of the claim. Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish
Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916). Regulations thus
require that a claim simply identify the damaged cargo, assert the carrier's liability, and demand "determinable" damages. There is an acknowledged circuit
split as to whether this regulation governs contested
claims, but all ten circuits that have ruled on the issue
assess a shipper's notice under either the regulation
or Blish's practical inquiry.

Contrary to Blish, the regulation, and the decisions
of those ten circuits, the Eighth Circuit held below
that a factually sufficient notice and denial did not
trigger the limitations periods merely because the notice cited Canadian law and stated that the shipper
"will submit" a Carmack claim at a later date.

The question presented is whether a shipper's notice asserting a rail carrier's liability for damage to
specifically identified cargo and demanding a determinable amount of money is rendered insufficient to
trigger binding UBL limitations periods because the
notice does not purport to rely on Carmack.

Whether a shipper's notice asserting a rail carrier's liability for damage to specifically identified cargo and demanding a determinable amount of money is rendered insufficient to trigger binding UBL limitations periods because the notice does not purport to rely on Carmack