1. Whether a relator's admission that he, in fact,
derived his complaint from public disclosures
triggers the Bar, requiring an analysis of
whether such a relator is an original source
of the information in his complaint, as every
other Circuit to consider the issue has held
held but that the Third Circuit below rejected,
an issue as to which there is now a conflict
among the Circuits, which raises an important
question of federal law that has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court.

2. Whether the application of section 3730(e)(4)
is determined according to the textually based
test applied in the Fourth, Fifth (pre-2017),
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, under which a
court asks only whether the disclosed allegations or transactions form the basis of, or are
substantially similar to, a relator's complaint;
or according to the extra-statutory X+Y=Z
test first articulated in United States ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and adopted by the
First, Second, Third, Fifth (post-2017), Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits, an issue as to which the
Circuits are divided, and which raises an important question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court.

3. Whether the Third Circuit's new, heightened
standard, requiring that public disclosures reveal "actual" and "concrete" fraud, as opposed
merely to a "possibility" or "inference" of fraud,
as every other Circuit has held, unduly narrows the Bar, an issue as to which the Circuits
are now divided, and which raises an important question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Whether a relator's admission that he derived his complaint from public disclosures triggers the public disclosure bar, whether the public disclosure bar is determined by a textual or extra-statutory test, whether the public disclosure bar requires 'actual' and 'concrete' fraud