Andrew Bennett, et al. v. Jefferson County, Alabama
1. May the doctrine of equitable mootness bar an
appeal to an Article III Judg e of a Plan of Adjustment
providing for ratemaking enforcement authority by
the Bankruptcy Court of sewer user rates and fees
pledged to pay refinanced pre -petition Sewer revenue
warrants for forty years in violation of the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of municipal utility ratemaking authority to the States and to the people?
2. If the Bankruptcy Act allows appeals to be
mooted for only two specific consummated transfers
or distributions of property (defined in 11 USCS
§ 1101(2)) unless a stay is ob tained before the appeal,
to wit :
(1) business asset sales or leases (11 USCS
§ 363), and
(2) loans or credit advances of new post -petition
operating funding secured by business assets
in priority to other cr editors (11 USCS § 364).
This case raises the extremely significant issue
of how can the Judge made doctrine of Equitable
Mootness extend and enlarge the mooting of appeals from two to all consummated transactions unless a
stay is obtained before the appeal, and not contra vene the Act and Congressional limits on the types of
transfers plainly stated in § 363 and § 364 which may
be mooted as proscribed by the Act?
3. Because under the Tenth Amendment judicial
power to determine the extent of Federal jurisdiction over municipal sewer utility ratemaking resides in
an Article III Court, may an Article I, legislative
Judge use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar
review by an Article III Judg e of a refinancing of pre petition sewer warrant debt subject to a claim by
Petitioners, who are ratepayers and special tax payers, that the Federal Bankruptcy Judge's ex clusive power to enforce sewer rates charged to repay
the debt violates powers "reserved to States or to the
people" under the Tenth Amendment. ( See, Appendix
D, excerpt from BK 2248, Co nfirmation Order dated
11/22/13))
4. May equitable mootne ss be applied to bar
appeal and review of the Article I, legislative Judge's
invalidation of State sovereignty over issuance of
County sewer revenue debt embodied in express State
constitutional provisions (a) requiring majority voter
approval of sewer fees which result in a foreclosure
liens on real property of sewer users, and (b) having
other limits on, and requirem ents for, debt issuance
and use of debt proceeds for public purposes (see, e.g.,
New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144, 149, 112 S.
Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992)) especi ally where a Chapter 9
Plan's consistency with State sovereignty was a foun dational requirement for this Court's initial ruling
sanctioning Chapter 9's constitutionality under the
Tenth Amendment under United States v. Bekins ,
304 U.S. 27, 58 S. Ct. 811 (1938) and, cf., Ashton v.
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement D. No. 1, 298
U.S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892 (1936).
5. Since transfers and distributions of property
not subject to reversal on appeal under § 363, § 364
and § 1101
Bankruptcy court's exclusive power over municipal sewer ratemaking